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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Some have called it “The Best Answer to Every Legal Question,”1 while 
others roll their eyes and call it the “typical lawyer answer.” After all, can 
the public really blame lawyers for this ambiguous answer when we are 
taught to analyze legal problems under the guise of “Getting to Maybe”?2 
Of course, this inquiry is rhetorical, but it is indisputable that the phrase 
“it depends” has certainly left a particular taste of disdain in the public’s 
mouth. 
Undeniably, many legal problems are heavily fact-specific and require 
a particular amount of individualized assessment and cannot be answered 
with a simple “yes” or “no.” Certainly, “it depends” seems, at the very least, 
a fair answer when the extrapolated effects of a specific proposal have yet 
to be ascertained. Like most legal inquiries, “it depends” is a perfectly 
calculated response to a corporation that might inquire whether introducing 
sustainability performance measures to its executive compensation plan is 
a good idea. 
As corporations continue to innovate and adapt with the changing 
economic times, and the corresponding regulatory environment, many 
have introduced new policies and measures in executive compensation.3  
In addition to pay-for-performance becoming the industry norm,4 some 
corporations are going further by introducing sustainability-based 
performance measures. It is no secret that sustainability practices are 
affecting corporations throughout the United States, as evidenced by the 
onslaught of sustainability committees and other corporate-wide sustainability 
practices;5 however, the introduction of meaningful sustainability initiatives 
and the use of sustainability performance measures as a means by which 
to compensate executives are two entirely separate ideas. 
 
 1.  Stephen Futeral, The BEST Answer to EVERY Legal Question, CHARLESTON 
LAWYERS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.charlestonlaw.net/best-answer-every-legal-
question-charleston-lawyers/. 
 2.  RICHARD FISCHEL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW 
SCHOOL EXAMS (1999). 
 3.  Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation 
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 228 n.3 
(1999–2000) (acknowledging that some have linked the pay-for-performance philosophy 
to the Protestant Reformation and some have gone even further as to tie the principle to 
Julius Caesar before the birth of Christ.). 
 4.  See generally Pay for Performance, GLASSLEWIS.COM, http://www.glasslewis.com/ 
issuer/pay-for-performance/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Pay for Performance, 
GLASSLEWIS]. 
 5.  See Jayne W. Barnard, At the Intersection of Corporate Governance and 
Environmental Sustainability, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 207, 213 (2011). 
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Although sustainability performance appears to be a logical extension 
of the traditional performance-based compensation model, the effect and 
result of such performance remains unclear and untested across the 
market.6 The adoption of broad-based sustainability performance measures 
may be dangerous because, often times, these measures are tailored to the 
corporation and may decrease total shareholder return in the short run.7 
Regardless of whether or not the corporation decides to introduce these 
measures, their effect on total shareholder return8 and other corporate 
interests requires an individualized analysis. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the current state of executive 
compensation, including the use of peer group benchmarking in establishing 
executive pay and the use of performance-based compensation. This 
overview will describe the characteristics of a peer group and considerations 
that compensation consultants evaluate before they select peer groups. 
Part II also discusses how performance-based compensation became 
prominent, the basic reasoning for performance-based compensation, and 
other tax related reasons for adopting performance-based compensation 
under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Part III, the primary purpose of this Comment, examines sustainability 
in corporate America. Specifically, this section defines “sustainability” 
and “sustainability performance measures,” and discusses how corporations 
currently embrace sustainability through an industry sample featuring 
three uniquely situated corporations. Finally, Part III concludes by examining 
the primary concern with embracing sustainability performance measures: 
accurate measurement. 
Part IV engages in a broad-based examination of corporate social 
responsibility concerns that must be vetted before introducing corporate 
sustainability measures. This section examines the Shareholder Primacy 
 
 6.  A small minority of corporations go as far as to include sustainability 
performance measures in performance-based compensation plans. See Michael Meehan, 
Tying Executive Pay To Sustainability Performance, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www. 
forbes.com/2010/10/25/executive-compensation-linkage-technology-sustainability-goals. 
html. 
 7.  These measures may also be dangerous to introduce to proxy materials due to 
an influx of recent lawsuits arising for “incomplete” or “misleading” disclosures of pay 
practices. See The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies 15 
(2014). 
 8.  Id. at 4 (“The say-on-pay provision of the Dodd-Frank Act has heightened 
concerns about the alignment of pay-for-performance with total shareholder return, 
making this a top consideration in 2013.”). 
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View,9 as advocated by prominent free-market economist Milton 
Friedman, and the Triple Bottom Line10 approach. This section concludes by 
reviewing the emerging theory of the Sustainability Model of Corporate 
Social Responsibility.11  Part V offers concluding reflections on the 
individualized considerations that must be discussed before introducing 
sustainability performance measures into a corporation’s executive 
compensation plan. 
II.  CURRENT PRACTICES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
In accordance with federal law,12 the New York Stock Exchange listing 
standards and the NASDAQ listing standards,13 publicly-held corporations 
must establish a compensation committee comprised of “independent” 
members of its board of directors.  The compensation committee is 
responsible for establishing and governing the compensation and benefit 
policies of the corporation.  Specifically, a compensation committee “assists 
the [b]oard of [d]irectors in its responsibilities with respect to the 
compensation of the [c]orporation’s executive officers and other key 
employees, and administers all employee benefit plans . . . .”14  The 
compensation committee, typically through a compensation consultant, 
considers numerous criteria including: the executive officer’s annual base 
salary, target annual incentive bonus, target long-term incentive 
compensation, performance-based compensation goals and target total 
direct compensation for executives among peer group companies,15 as 
well as tenure, future potential, cost of living, and the corporation’s 
performance against various pre-established internal operational and 
qualitative goals.16 
 
 9.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 10.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 11.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 12.  SEC Listing Standards Relating to Compensation Committees, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10C-1 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2014); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2014). 
 13.  Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation 
Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639, 78 Fed. Reg. 4570 (Jan. 11, 2013); 
Order Approving NASDAQ’s Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Compensation Committees, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-68640, 78 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
 14.  SJW, Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 10 (Mar. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/766829/000076682913000010/sjw2013proxy.htm#s 
41B92A74A5D428673F9D50F7830C5CD7. 
 15.  Starbucks Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 31 (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000119312513024028/d455402ddef14a.htm. 
 16.  SJW, Corp., infra note 14, at 44. 
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Many industry leaders17 and corporations18 believe that executive 
compensation plans and policies need to be closely tied to the corporation 
and its shareholders.  Compensation consultants and many corporate 
officers posit that if the primary duty of the corporation is to increase its 
profits,19 then aligning executive compensation practices with the 
performance of the corporation’s stock, in relation to its peers, will most 
closely align the executives’ interests with that of the shareholders.20 
A.  Peer Grouping 
Typically, “peer grouping” is initiated by the compensation committee’s 
retention of a compensation consultant who “advise[s] on the design and 
balance of the whole executive reward plan.”21 The compensation 
consultant then attempts to put the proposed compensation plan into 
market perspective by “construct[ing] a framework of comparative metrics 
based on the level and structure of pay at companies deemed similar.”22 
According to corporate governance provider, Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”), peer groups generally contain between fourteen (14) to 
twenty-four (24) corporations that are “reasonably similar to the subject 
company in terms of industry profile, size, and market capitalization.”23 
These peer groups also consider criteria such as global reach, geographic 
 
 17.  Pay for Performance, GLASSLEWIS, supra note 4. 
 18.  Guess?, Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 30 (May 29, 2013), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912463/000091246313000014/0000912463-13-000014- 
index.htm. 
 19.  Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine -The Social Responsibility of Business 
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33. 
 20.  To see how performance and executive pay correlated for a small sample of 
corporations during the last fiscal year, see Theo Francis & Joann Lublin, CEO Pay Rising but 




 21.  Executive Compensation, THE HAY GROUP, http://www.haygroup.com/us/ 
services/index.aspx?id=1690 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
 22.  Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups and 
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 494 (2012). 
 23.  2015 U.S. Compensation Policies: Frequently Asked Questions , 
ISSGOVERANCE.COM (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015 
comprehensivecompensationfaqs.pdf; SJW, Corp., infra note 14, at 45 (noting that peer 
companies were selected “on the basis of objective industry classifications, geographic 
location and financial size criteria.”). 
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location, brand recognition, performance, and companies with which the 
corporation may compete for executive talent or customers.24 Although 
critics suggest that peer groups are one leading cause of executive 
overcompensation,25 the industry continues to whole-heartedly embrace 
the comparative process.26 In general, corporations use their peer group’s 
compensation plans as a benchmark off which they evaluate their own 
proposed compensation plan.27 After the compensation consultant and 
committee complete the peer group market analysis, they revise the 
proposed compensation plan in an attempt to create a plan in or around 
the fiftieth percentile of the peer group as to avoid being an outlier and 
being subject to heightened Say-on-Pay scrutiny.28 
B.   Performance-Based Compensation29 
In addition to the applicable state and federal law, publicly-held 
corporations must also adhere to 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (“Section 162(m)”),30 
which is commonly referred to as the “million-dollar-cap rule.”31  Section 
162(m) limits the amount that a public corporation can deduct  as 
compensation paid to any “covered employee” to one million dollars, per 
 
 24.  Starbucks Corp., supra note 15, at 31. 
 25.  Elson and Ferrere, supra note 22, at 497–500 (discussing the problem with peer 
group analysis). 
 26.  For a general discussion of pay-for-performance methodology and peer 
benchmarking, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 
by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1659 (2005)(book review); 
James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising Above the 
“Pay-for-Performance” Principle, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 417 (2006). 
 27.  See Elson and Ferrere, supra note 22, at 494 (“The boards of most U.S. public 
companies set executive compensation through a mechanistic process referred to as peer 
grouping.”)(internal quotations omitted). 
 28.  In 2010, Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act codified the advisory “Say-on-Pay” vote of the Named Executive Officers 
by shareholders. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–
5641). 
 29.  As used in this Comment, the term “performance-based compensation” refers 
to compensation based on objective performance measures, such as profits, return on equity, 
earnings per share and other more individual and specific criterion. Other commentators may 
also use the term “contingent compensation” interchangeably. 
 30.  26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(2014). 
 31.  Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of 
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 287 (1999) (“Under § 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code . . . compensation to an executive of more than one million dollars per 
year is not deductible by the corporation unless it is performance-based.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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person, per year.32 However, Section 162(m) provides several exceptions 
to the million-dollar-cap rule. Pertinently, Section 162(m) excludes 
performance-based compensation33 from its definition of “applicable 
employee remuneration.”34 Therefore, publicly-held companies incorporate 
performance-based compensation into their compensation plans, not only 
because it purportedly motivates executives to create shareholder value,35 but 
also for alternative tax purposes. 
In the 1990s, performance-based compensation rose in popularity when 
protests broke out over rising levels of executive compensation.36  In light 
of these protests,37 performance-based compensation became the primary 
method by which corporations based their compensation plans because it 
was seen as an objective benchmark to measure executive performance.38  
Today, similar to the 1990s, “performance continues to be the name of the 
game,”39 with leading compensation consultants observing that “executive 
incentives are shifting to reward performance in both short- and long-term 
incentives.”40  In justification of performance-based compensation, 
experts argue that such performance methodology “[provides an] incentive 
for executives to perform in ways that maximize corporate/shareholder 
 
 32.  26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1)(2014) (“[N]o deduction shall be allowed under this 
chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to 
the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such 
employee exceeds $1,000,000.”). 
 33.  For a further discussion of the performance-based compensation exemption, see 
P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN LAPIDUS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FOR EMERGING 
GROWTH CORPORATIONS § 2:80 (3d ed. 2013). 
 34.  26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(2014). 
 35.  See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14 n.78 (2000) (noting that some scholars have suggested that 
Section 162(m) indicates that Congress “believes that performance-based plans motivate 
executives to create shareholder value.”). 
 36.  See Graef S. Crystal, CEOs and Incentives: The Myth of “Pay for Performance”, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-01-08/business/fi-17839_1_pay-
plan. 
 37.  Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach 
to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 61 (1992) (arguing that executives are 
overcompensated). 
 38.  See Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The 
Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 31 
(referencing a report that noted that more than 80% of the largest U.S. corporations tie 
long-term performance of the corporation to executive compensation). 
 39.  The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies, 
supra note 7, at 4. 
 40.  Id. at 16. 
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wealth” and “[pays] executives commensurately with their contribution to 
a corporation’s growth and performance.”41  Although academic studies 
disagree on whether performance-based compensation plans are effective,42 
compensation experts generally agree that “[p]ay for performance makes 
the most sense when the link between compensation and performance is 
clear.”43  With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,44 the Say-on-Pay process “heightened 
the emphasis on ensuring that [executive] pay appropriately reflects  
performance,”45 thus pressuring corporations to set forth readily measureable 
performance-based goals.  Despite the difficulty in setting performance 
goals,46 it is critical in effectively crafting a performance-based compensation 
plan that is compliant with Section 162(m) and satisfies the shareholders 
through the Say-on-Pay process. 
Performance-based compensation is typically comprised of both short-
term and long-term incentive compensation. Although each compensation 
plan is unique, the typical composition includes an annual base salary 
with short-term performance incentives, including annual bonuses,  
discretionary performance awards, and long-term performance incentives, 
typically comprised of performance-based restricted stock units and 
performance shares.  Leading compensation consultants also note that 
compensation plans once dominated by stock options47 have now shifted 
towards a combination of restricted stock, restricted stock units, and 
performance-based restricted stock, depending on the industry.48  Other 
post-employment benefits may also be included as part of an executive 
compensation plan including retirement benefits, deferred compensation, 
and severance benefits.  In addition, most compensation plans also include 
executive perquisites, namely, the use of the corporate aircraft, financial 
 
 41.  See Stabile, supra note 3, at 229–30. 
 42.  Id. at 239–41. 
 43.  Loewenstein, supra note 35, at 13. 
 44.  For a summary of the Dodd-Frank Act, see P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN 
LAPIDUS, supra note 33, at § 3:82. 
 45.  The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies, 
supra note 7, at 13. 
 46.  Katherine Connor, CEO pay shifts to long-term, performance-based equity, THE 
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Mar. 20, 2014, available at http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm? 
SourceCode=20140320czf&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NightlyNews&utm_camp
aign=2014-0320&_t=CEO+pay+shifts+to+longterm+performancebased+equity#.UyuS5O29LCQ 
(“Setting the goals was probably the most challenging part . . . helping to frame and set 
those long-term goals for performance shares.”). 
 47.  A stock option is a right to purchase company stock at a defined exercise price 
over a specified option term. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (9th ed. 2009). 
 48.  Connor, supra note 46. 
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planning services, company cars, security, supplemental life insurance, 
and physical exams.49 
All told, corporations, their compensation committees, and compensation 
consultants generally design compensation plans to recruit and retain top 
executive talent, to reward the achievement of financial and operational 
goals, and to align the executives’ interests with that of the corporation’s 
long-term strategy, the shareholders’ interests, and the interests of the 
corporation’s customer base.50  Despite some recent examples of excessive 
compensation,51 empirical research has generally indicated that the structure 
of the compensation plan directly correlates to the positive financial return 
of the corporation.52 
III.  SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Before current sustainability performance measures can be reviewed 
and evaluated, we must attempt to define sustainability and sustainability 
performance measures.  Despite how casually the term “sustainability” is 
used, it is fairly ambiguous and deserves a closer look. 
A.  What is Sustainability? 
The term “sustainability” is consistently used by environmentalists, 
politicians, and the news media, but there is little consensus regarding a 
 
 49.  The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data Trends and Strategies, 
supra note 7, at 10. 
 50.  Many leading scholars have criticized performance-based compensation as an 
effective method of compensating executives. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, 
supra note 26; John E. Core et. al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (2005) (summarizing Bebchuk and Fried’s 
thesis “that executive compensation practices in the U.S. benefit corporate executives at 
the expense of shareholders through implicit and explicit corruption of the pay-setting 
process.”). 
 51.  Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock-Salary and Options Too: The Looting of 
Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419-20 nn.1–10 (2010) (discussing various excessive 
and egregious executive compensation plans). 
 52.  See Robert T. Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent 
Equity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278, 1278–79 (1971) (stating that “firms with 
executives whose financial interests are more closely parallel to the goals of the stockholders 
and the long-run profitability of the firm do indeed outperform other firms in stock 
return.”); John R. Deckop, Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation, 41 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 215, 224–25 (1988) (noting “that among firms of equal size, CEO 
compensation tends to increase directly with profits.”). 
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functional definition.53  Some commentators have suggested that sustainability 
means “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.”54  Consequently, some 
commentators posit that sustainable businesses attempt to “tread[] as lightly 
as possible on the earth and its natural resources.”55 
While each of these definitions are helpful as a starting place, for 
purposes of this Comment, “[e]nvironmental sustainability involves 
protecting the environment, preventing further harms to nature, cleaning 
up pollution and other harmful emissions, conserving and recycling, 
maintaining the ecosystem, improving the environment, and/or restoring 
the ecosystem to a former, a pristine or pre-human condition.”56  This 
thorough framework will provide a useful starting point to evaluate and 
discuss the sustainability performance measures currently used by 
publicly-held corporations. 
B.  What is a Sustainability Performance Measure? 
Most often, sustainability performance measures are closely tied or 
synonymous to sustainability principles and policies referred to elsewhere as 
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (“ESG”) measures.57  
While ESG measures may sometimes include categories outside of the 
 
 53.  See Sustainability in Executive Compensation, EXECCOMP.ORG, http://www.exec 
comp.org/Issues/Issue/corporate-governance/sustainability-in-executive-compensation (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2013) (“A discussion of sustainability with regard to executive compensation 
typically refers to the growing interest by stakeholders of linking executive pay to 
sustainability measures, often referred to as environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
metrics, although definitions vary considerably among activists and investors.”); see also 
Barnard, supra note 5, at 214 (“[W]hen asked ‘how does your company define sustainability?’ 
32.4 percent of [companies] answered ‘we avoid definitions and focus on actions.’”). 
 54.  Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 990 (2009). 
 55.  Id. at 990–91. 
 56.  Barnard, supra note 5, at 209–10 n.4; Matteo Tonello, Sustainability in the 
Boardroom, A 2013 Update, THE CONFERENCE BOARD 1, 1 (2013), https://www. 
conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V5N6-13.pdf&type=subsite 
(defining sustainability as “an all-inclusive descriptor of any business initiative that the 
corporation pursues based on considerations involving the interest of any stakeholder that 
appears critical to the success of the business.”). 
 57.  See Key Characteristics of Prominent Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on 
Environmental and Social Topics, 2005–2011, IRRC INSTITUTE 1, 4 (referring to ESG 
measures as “E+S topics”). 
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environmental scope,58 a significant portion of quantifiable research 
specifically relates to these measures.59 
For example, CERES, the leading non-profit organization advocating 
for sustainable leadership, with the help of Sustainalytics,60 published a 
2012 report61 examining and evaluating numerous ESG measures.  
Pertinently, the report evaluated six hundred (600) of the largest U.S. 
corporations “on their progress towards meeting the expectations laid 
forth in the CERES Roadmap for Sustainability.”62  According to CERES, 
the data indicated that the use of ESG performance measures in executive 
compensation plans is an emerging trend, but “still an anomaly.”63  Only 
seven percent (7%) of the six hundred (600) corporations “formally tied 
ESG performance to executive compensation”64 and nine percent (9%) of 
those corporations did so without publishing specific targets.65  The 2010 
CERES Roadmap for Sustainability66 set forth twenty (20) expectations 
broken into four specific categories: (1) governance; (2) stakeholder 
engagement; (3) disclosure; and (4) performance.67  Although these 
categories have varying degrees of integration, the performance category will 
be the main focus for the purpose of this analysis because it is the typical 
measure used when evaluating executive compensation plans.68  Thus, this 
Comment will discuss sustainability performance measures, most commonly, 
 
 58.  ESG measures sometimes encompass measures other than environmental 
sustainability including employee morale, animal testing and diversity initiatives. 
 59.  See G3: Executive Compensation tied to ESG Performance, CERES, http:// 
www.ceres.org/roadmap-assessment/company-performance/governance-for-sustainability/copy 
_of_executive-compensation-tied-to-esg-performance (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) [hereinafter 
G3, CERES]. 
 60.  For more information about this sustainability research firm, see About Us, 
SUSTAINALYTICS.COM, http://www.sustainalytics.com/about-us (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
 61.  CERES, The ROAD TO 2020: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES ROADMAP 
FOR SUSTAINABILITY, available at http://www.ceres.org/roadto2020 [hereinafter CERES, 
ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY]. 
 62.  See G3, CERES, supra note 59. 
 63.  CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 16. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  CERES, The 21st Century Corporation: The Ceres Roadmap for Sustainability, 
available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/ceres-roadmap-to-sustainability-2010/view 
[hereinafter CERES, The 21st Century Corporation]. 
 67.  CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 5 (discussing the 2010 
Roadmap expectations). 
 68.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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the reduction in the overall carbon footprint of the corporation and broader 
environmental goals in the areas of energy, water and recycling. 
C.  An Overview of Current Corporate Sustainability Measures 
As highlighted by CERES, approximately fifty percent (50%) of the six 
hundred (600) corporations participating in the research were making 
progress in decreasing one main ESG measure—overall greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions.69  Typically, corporations achieved this through a 
reduction in energy demands, acquiring alternative energy sources, and 
focusing on energy efficiency,70 but only one-third of the sample 
corporations had set a time-bound target for reducing such emissions.71  
In addition to the goals and results relating to GHG emissions, CERES 
found that only twenty-five percent (25%) of corporations had undertaken 
assessments relating to water management and, similarly, only twenty-
five percent (25%) of corporations currently maintained any degree of 
supply chain monitoring.72  The lackluster data reported by CERES begs 
the following question: why is there such reluctance by U.S. corporations to 
embrace ESG performance criteria?  If corporations are so reluctant to 
embrace ESG measures in any capacity, then perhaps it should not be a 
large surprise that so few corporations and compensation committees 
embrace ESG performance in their executive compensation practices and 
policies.73  While these statistics are certainly not dispositive, it certainly 
indicates, at a minimum, a reluctance to embrace ESG performance 
measures in any large scale. 
D.  Industry Sample 
How do corporations use sustainability performance measures in their 
executive compensation plans, and what are their standard measurements?  
The answer to each of these questions can be found in the 2013 compensation 
discussion and analysis (“CD&A”)74 sections of three publicly-held 
corporation’s proxy disclosures: (1) Intel Corporation; (2) XCEL Energy; and 
(3) Alcoa, Inc.  These unique corporations span three different industries 
including:  (a) technology, (b) energy and (c) aluminum production, and 
 
 69.  CERES, ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 61, at 6. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Tonello, supra note 56, at 11 (noting that more than 60% of respondent companies 
“do not embed sustainability-related metrics into their top-executive compensation policy.”). 
 74.  For a further description of the CD&A section in an annual proxy disclosure, 
see P. GARTH GARTRELL & STEVEN LAPIDUS, supra note 33, at § 3:42. 
SCHWEFEL(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2016  8:57 AM 
[VOL. 6:  247, 2014–15]  “Green” Performance 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 259 
each take a different approach to sustainability performance as incorporated 
by their executive compensation plans. 
1.  Intel Corporation 
Intel Corporation (“Intel”) has long been considered one of the leading 
corporations in terms of corporate sustainability.  Intel has gone further 
than any other corporation, tying the compensation of all employees, not 
simply executives, to sustainability metrics.75 
As disclosed in its annual proxy statement, “Intel’s pay-for-performance 
programs include performance-based cash compensation that varies 
depending on financial and operational performance . . . .”76  The operational 
component of Intel’s compensation plan is tied to the “company[‘s] 
performance in several key areas, including financial performance, product 
design and development roadmaps, manufacturing, cost, and productivity 
improvement, customer satisfaction, and corporate responsibility and 
environmental sustainability.”77  Most notably, Intel’s compensation 
committee selects operational goals that are also used in the “broad-based 
employee annual incentive cash plan and are prepared each year as part 
of the annual planning process for the company, so that all employees 
are focused on achieving the same company-wide operational results.”78  
Interestingly enough, Intel also recognizes that some of its operational 
goals have “non-quantitative measures that require some degree of 
subjective evaluation.”79 
Although Intel does not disclose more specific information in its 
CD&A, the company does confirm that operational goals have scored, on 
average, 98.9% over the past five years.80  Intel has achieved incredible 
results through the use of the above-stated performance-based operational 
component in that it “has reduced [its] energy use by [eight] percent and 
its GHG emissions by [twenty-three] percent”81 since the introduction of 
the component.  While Intel’s results are certainly impressive, the open 
publication of specific ESG performance goals would: (i) encourage other 
 
 75.  G3, CERES, supra note 59. 
 76.  Intel Corp., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 37 (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http:// 
www.intc.com/intelProxy2013/static/pdfs/Intel_2013_Proxy_Statement.pdf. 
 77.  Id. at 54. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 55. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  G3, CERES, supra note 59. 
SCHWEFEL(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2016  8:57 AM 
 
260 
corporations to publicly disclose similar data, (ii) reflect an industry trend 
towards corporate sustainability, and (iii) provide further empirical data to 
support the economic feasibility of such ESG performance goals. 
2.  XCEL Energy 
On a year-over-year basis, XCEL Energy (“XCEL”) achieved incredible 
results relating to its pre-established sustainability performance goals.  In 
its 2013 proxy statement, XCEL stated that it met its financial and 
operational sustainable performance goals for fiscal year 2012, thereby 
increasing its annual dividends to shareholders for the ninth consecutive 
year by 3.8%.82 
Relating to environmental leadership, XCEL claims to have maximized its 
“demand side management programs,” allowing customers to save energy 
at a rate of 18.4% over 2011 for which the corporation earned $81.7 
million in incentives.  Furthermore, the corporation earned the following 
achievements: a spot on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index for a sixth 
time, a position on the Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index for the fifth 
consecutive year, named number two in sustainable operations among public 
U.S. utility companies by Target Rock Advisors, LLC, and earned the 
Energy Star Sustained Excellence Award for the third time.83  In addition 
to its sustainability accolades, XCEL also surpassed other ESG performance 
goals in employee and executive diversity.84 
XCEL’s compensation philosophy is heavily weighted for performance-
based compensation under the theory that executives will be motivated to 
achieve in the area of financial, operational, and stock price performance.85  
Under its theory, XCEL awards executives “performance units,” which 
make up almost two-thirds of its entire compensation plan over a three (3) 
year performance period.  Approximately one third of the performance units 
“have a performance goal based on achieving environmental commitments, 
while maintaining a competitive price for service provided to [its] customers 
as measured relative to [its] peers.”86  As evidenced by its 2013 proxy 
statement, XCEL has not waivered in its short-term or long-term commitment 
to environmental leadership all whilst achieving annual increases in 
revenue and shareholder dividends.87 
 
 82.  Xcel Energy Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 37 (Apr. 8, 2013), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72903/000119312513145419/d448819ddef14a.htm. 
 83.  Id. at 38. 
 84.  See id. at 37–38 (highlighting Operational Excellence and Corporate Stewardship). 
 85.  Id. at 38. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 37–38. 
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3.  Alcoa, Inc. 
Alcoa, Inc. (“Alcoa”) bases eighty-seven percent (87%) of the Chief 
Executive Officer’s target pay based on performance, sixty-eight percent 
(68%) of which is earned in the form of equity compensation.88  By relying 
heavily on performance and directly correlating its equity compensation 
with the corporation’s stock price, Alcoa believes that it aligns its 
executive compensation practices with shareholder interests. 
Specifically, Alcoa “reinforces pay for performance through annual and 
long-term incentive targets focused on achieving strong financial and 
operational performance in respect of goals over which Alcoa 
managers have direct control.”89  In a shift from Intel and XCEL, Alcoa 
specifically clarifies that the performance goals are strictly related to 
matters in which the executives have control.  Alcoa contends that since 
this has been a standard practice for many years, its “management team is 
highly focused on achieving productivity gains and other operational and 
strategic improvements that benefit [the] top and bottom line 
performance.”90 Alcoa also reports that twenty percent (20%) of all cash 
incentive targets are based on an increase in energy efficiency and the 
minimization of the corporation’s carbon footprint, which intimately 
aligns with its “financial and societal commitments.”91 
Despite economic and political uncertainty across its four businesses, 
Alcoa managed to generate approximately $1.3 billion in productivity 
gains and overhead costs reductions in fiscal year 2012.  Alcoa has also 
achieved an almost twenty-nine percent (29%) reduction in year-end debt 
level since 2008 and, overall has significantly strengthened its liquidity 
position.  Despite a declining price of aluminum and an adverse impact on 
total shareholder return, Alcoa’s common stock price remained stagnant—
increasing minimally from $8.65 per share on December 30, 2011 to $8.68 
per share on December 31, 2012.92  Although the falling price of aluminum 
has caused a decrease in total shareholder return and stock prices, Alcoa 
remains steadfast in its corporate commitment to environmental sustainability 
 
 88.  Alcoa Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement, at 35 (Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4281/000130817913000074/lalcoa2013_def14a.htm. 
 89.  Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 37. 
 92.  Alcoa Inc., supra note 88, at 50. 
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and its incorporation of such a commitment to its executive compensation 
plan. 
E.  Difficulties Facing Sustainability Performance Measures 
Similar to the difficulties of implementing performance-based 
compensation, the introduction of sustainability performance measures 
also face its fair share of criticism and critiques, the leading of which 
relates to accurate measurement. 
1.  Accurate Measurement 
As applicable to executive compensation, sustainability performance 
measures face one big hurdle: accurate measurement.  In executive 
compensation, a performance-based measure needs to be easily measured and 
clearly communicated to shareholders through regulatory disclosures.93  The 
difficulty with some sustainability performance measures is that they are not 
easily measureable in the short-term.  For example, many ESG performance 
measures are part of a long-term corporate strategy (e.g, decreasing energy 
output over five years), and are thus unable to be measured for the annual 
executive compensation bonuses.  While some metrics are certainly 
measureable, such as a decrease in GHG emissions or a decrease in energy 
usage, others are more difficult to scale down in the short term.  Although 
minor instances of difficult measurement is not a major concern, we must 
remember that corporations utilize performance- based compensation as an 
avenue around Section 162(m),94 thus any sustainability performance 
criteria must be readily measureable, which only further highlights the 
importance of accurate measurement. 
However, criticism of sustainability performance measures is certainly 
not a reason to completely abandon the practice.  Rather, compensation 
committees, compensation consultants, and others must take this into 
account when considering an addition to the proxy disclosures.  In fact, 
many of the measurement issues would be greatly diminished in importance 
if the sustainability measures were omitted from the compensation plans.  
Thus, prior to the introduction of sustainability measures, a corporation 
must, among other things, consider if the measure is quantifiable, and, if 
so, determine its feasibility in the context of recruiting and retaining top 
executive talent while upholding the corporate commitments. 
 
 93.  Failure to do so can result in litigation for “incomplete” or “misleading” disclosure 
of pay practices. For more information, see The Hay Group, Executive Compensation 
2013: Data Trends and Strategies, supra note 7, at 15. 
 94.  See discussion supra Section II.B. and nn.19, 21. 
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IV. GOING FORWARD 
There has been a long-held disagreement among those in academia 
about the role of the corporation:95 whether the corporation’s sole duty is 
to maximize shareholder profits96 or whether the corporation’s primary, 
but not exclusive, duty is to maximize shareholder profits.97  Before a 
corporation can effectively evaluate whether sustainability performance 
measures are appropriate, it must determine its approach to corporate 
social responsibility. 
A.  Shareholder Primacy View 
Friedman and Fischel argued that anyone who “declaim[s] that business is 
not concerned ‘merely’ with profit but also with promoting desirable 
‘social’ ends . . . [is] preaching pure and unadulterated socialism . . . and 
[is] [an] unwitting puppet[] of the intellectual forces that have been 
undermining the basis of a free society[.]”98  While this is a fairly strong 
position, the threshold question is whether Friedman and Fischel have a 
point here.  Does the corporation have a duty to “promote desirable social 
ends” by using a sustainability performance measure?  Assuming arguendo, 
that the corporation has no duty to promote social ends,99 are sustainability 
performance measures inappropriate in all circumstances?  This is likely 
not the case in today’s efficient marketplace. 
 
 95.  See Friedman, supra note 19; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982). But see Lynne L. Dallas, 
Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 19, 30 (1988). 
 96.  Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993) 
(“[T]he sole duty of a corporation’s officers is to maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
 97.  David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 523, 530–31 (2011) (“The constituency approach sees attention to 
nonshareholder interests as a cost that comes at the expense of profit and therefore of 
shareholder value. This is the trade-off or zero-sum assumption. In contrast, the sustainability 
perspective sees attention to nonshareholders—including investment in their well-being—as 
essential to the viability and success of the firm and therefore also to the enhancement of 
shareholder value.”). 
 98.  Friedman, supra note 19, at 33. 
 99.  Although this is certainly a theory discussed in corporate law, it is almost certain 
that shareholder primacy is not legally binding. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (the court deferred to Wrigley’s business judgment and upheld his 
decision regarding the installation of stadium lights). 
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Hypothetically, by embracing Friedman’s view, the corporation’s sole 
duty is to increase the profit of the shareholders.  Friedman’s shareholder 
primacy view, of course, allows the use of sustainability performance 
measures in a scenario where it would benefit the corporation’s financial 
bottom line.  For example, a resource-intensive company may expend 
significant waste and energy usage to provide a specific good, but the 
corporation may be able to incentivize its executive officers by offering 
an annual bonus to decrease the amount of energy usage while still 
increasing production levels of that specific good.  The corporation, of 
course, would be seeking to align its interests in driving down production 
costs (e.g., a decrease in energy expense or achieving certain production 
efficiencies) with the shareholder’s interests (e.g., profit or total shareholder 
return).  In the current example, the shareholder would experience greater 
profits because the costs of producing the good would decrease, while 
production of the good would increase incrementally, thus spurring 
increased profit upon sale.  Should the corporation fail to achieve this 
goal, the executive would not be rewarded for failure to perform under the 
pre-established compensation goal. 
It is apparent that manufacturing, energy, automobile, and other 
resource-intensive corporations will likely have more opportunities than 
other companies, such as investment banks, insurance providers, and 
professional service firms, to make business decisions that promote 
sustainability measures as well as benefit the corporation’s bottom line.100  
Although it accounts for a small overall percentage, The Conference Board 
found that manufacturing companies account for the highest percentage 
of entities that embrace a combination of financial and extra-financial 
metrics of performance.  Consequently, the question becomes: “how do 
non-resource intensive companies increase shareholder profits while 
instituting a sustainability performance measure?”  Certainly, and 
unsurprisingly, the answer to this inquiry is: “it depends.” 
1.  Triple Bottom Line 
Even if the corporation full-heartedly embraces Friedman’s shareholder 
primacy view, it is entirely possible that such sustainability measures may 
actually better the corporation’s bottom line.  The “triple bottom line” 
approach, as it is often called, views corporate performance in three 
dimensions: (1) economic prosperity, (2) environmental quality, and (3) 
social justice.101  Proponents of the “triple bottom line” approach argue 
that a sustainable mindset will not only increase financial performance (often 
 
 100.  Sneirson, supra note 54, at 992. 
 101.  Id. at 991. 
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expressed in terms of profits, return on investment, shareholder value, and 
total shareholder return), but also help the environment and society as a 
whole.102  While embracing Friedman’s shareholder primacy principles, the 
triple-bottom-line adherents note that “efforts to reduce waste and 
pollution often result in greater efficiency and the discovery of innovative 
techniques and materials, all of which in turn can benefit the 
[corporation] . . . in the short and long runs.”103  Under the triple-bottom-line 
approach, not only is it very possible to increase corporate profitability while 
embracing sustainability principles, but it will also require a fact-specific, 
individualized assessment.  Failure to do so may result in a decrease in 
shareholder profits, which would put the corporation at odds with the 
shareholder primacy view and may subject the corporation to heightened 
Say-on-Pay scrutiny. 
Although it appears possible to embrace sustainability performance 
measures under the shareholder primacy view, this Comment would never 
purport to suggest a broad, one-size-fits-all solution to this problem.  
However, there are characteristics that, through qualitative data gathering, 
may help a corporation evaluate whether or not a sustainability performance 
measure is feasible to incorporate in its executive compensation plan. 
B.  Sustainability Model of Corporate Social Responsibility104 
In part, the Sustainability Model of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(“Sustainability Model”) takes the position that the corporation has a duty 
to enhance profits only so far as survival requires it, but does not extend 
as far as to require profit maximization as required under the shareholder 
primacy theory.  Under the Sustainability Model, the case for a sustainability 
performance measure is much more straightforward, but still contains 
some technical difficulties. 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 992; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters 
Can a Director Service? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 761, 764–65 & n.9 (2008) (“[O]perating a business in an environmentally sustainable way 
[may] make[ ] good business sense and therefore increase[ ] long-term financial value.”). 
 104.  For ease of reference, this refers to the alternative method proposed by Professor 
Millon. See Millon, supra note 98. 
SCHWEFEL(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2016  8:57 AM 
 
266 
As Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.105 set forth, a corporation is only organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of its shareholders.106  This 
noteworthy opinion implies that shareholder profit is the primary purpose, 
as opposed to the exclusive purpose, of the corporation.  In support of this 
interpretation, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) published its Principles of 
Corporate Governance (the “Principles”).  Section 2.01 of the Principles 
states: 
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b), a corporation should have as its 
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate 
profit and shareholder gain; (b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are 
not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of the business . . . (2) 
[m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as 
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and (3) [m]ay devote a 
reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, education, and 
philanthropic purposes.107 
In light of the Principles, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., and other 
constituency statutes,108 there is a strong case for the Sustainability 
Model.109  Assuming the various authorities above were not present, it is 
likely that corporate executives would still have the latitude to pursue 
shareholder profit as the primary purpose, rather than the exclusive 
purpose, under the Business Judgment Rule.110  Under the Sustainability 
Model, there is little debate whether the corporation and the board of 
directors would be insulated from any liability should they decide to 
pursue environmental measures. 
As the regulatory environment surrounding sustainability continues to 
evolve, corporations must ask: “where do we want to go from here?”  As 
the industry sample demonstrates, each corporation takes a unique approach 
to sustainability.  The decision to invest in infrastructure to create 
 
 105.  204 Mich. 459 (1919). 
 106.  Id. at 507 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. 
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 107.  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Section 2.01 (1994). 
 108.  For an example of a constituency statute, see ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, 
CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 99–100 (2010). 
 109.  See generally Millon, supra note 98. 
 110.  For a discussion of the Business Judgment Rule, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004); 
Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business 
Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635–39 (2007). 
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manufacturing efficiencies, to make a concentrated effort to decrease energy 
costs, or to sponsor a corporate-wide initiative on recycling, comes at no 
small cost, especially to a corporation’s shareholders.  Shareholders face an 
unstable economy and an increasingly polarized government in Washington 
D.C. that lends itself to uncertain regulations. Furthermore, shareholders 
may frown upon unnecessary financial risks that put their total shareholder 
returns in jeopardy.  Despite these shareholder concerns, nearly seven 
hundred U.S. corporations have publicly called for action on climate 
change.111  If U.S. public companies feel a “social” responsibility to act on 
climate change, the next logical question becomes “how should the 
companies react?” 
The answer to this question is: “it depends.”  With nearly sixty percent 
(60%) of corporations having already established renewable energy goals 
and greenhouse gas reduction goals,112 it appears clear that companies feel 
comfortable taking unilateral steps to affect climate change.  However, the 
issue this Comment presents is whether or not a corporation should take 
the initiative to introduce the sustainability performance measures to its 
executive compensation plan. 
First and foremost, corporations need to reconcile the dichotomy 
between shareholder primacy and the Sustainability Model and weigh 
each accordingly before moving forward.  With this at the forefront of 
their decision-making, corporations can move forward to identify meaningful 
ESG concerns and determine if it should focus on profit alone or balancing 
profit and CSR. 
If the answer is solely shareholder profit, then the question becomes 
whether or not the companies within their peer group compensate 
executives by this standard.  This is important because if the peer group 
companies do not use sustainability performance metrics, then the 
corporation will be an outlier and may face a more difficult time in 
recruiting and retaining top executives.  With such a small existing sample, 
this may be a unique situation for compensation consultants, but, 
undoubtedly, should be a primary consideration.  From that point, the 
decision becomes an individual analysis based on current market share, 
financial performance, and goodwill. 
 
 111.  Mindy Lubber, Why Microsoft, eBay (And 650 Other Businesses) Are Calling 
for U.S. Climate Action, FORBES (Sep. 27, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mindy 
lubber/2013/09/27/why-microsoft-ebay-and-650-other-businesses-are-calling-for-u-s-climate- 
action/. 
 112.  Id. 
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If it becomes a balancing act between profit and CSR, then the 
corporation is likely better off by embracing corporation-wide sustainability 
initiatives facilitated and monitored by a sustainability committee or a 
Chief Sustainability Officer.113  The formation of a board committee on 
sustainability alone indicates that the corporation has made corporate 
sustainability a priority.114 
From this point, corporations can gather quantitative data off of which 
they can determine the feasibility of introducing such a performance 
measure to its executive compensation plan.  This analysis would consider 
the relationship between the ESG measures and the financial performance of 
the corporation.  The ultimate conclusion of whether or not this would be 
appropriate for an individual corporation would be solely based on the 
feedback and data gathered by the committee or Chief Sustainability 
Officer.  This cautious and restrained approach prevents swift and drastic 
corporate initiatives that have the potential to cause a decrease in total 
shareholder return and loss in profits.  Additionally, the more data that is 
gathered over time, the more precise a corporate sustainability initiative 
can be, should it be established in the future.  This precision, effectively, 
limits the amount of wasted resources that could be invested in a failed 
performance measure and adds value to the corporation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Each component of an executive compensation plan has a specific 
purpose to comply with a very complex collection of state and federal 
laws and regulations.  Assuming a corporation clearly identifies and 
establishes an objective, readily-measurable sustainability performance 
measure it would almost certainly be protected by the Business Judgment 
Rule to establish the desired environmental measures.  This conclusion 
too, however, presents an issue: whether or not sustainability performance- 
based compensation is the most efficient means to achieve corporate 
sustainability goals.  There is, of course, an easy answer to this question 
as well: “it depends” on the conclusion of a fact-specific, individualized 
assessment of a variety of factors particular to that corporation. 
 
 113.  For an example of a corporate sustainability initiative not integrated into an 
executive compensation plan, see Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Report, 
Fiscal Year 2014, BEST BUY, available at https://corporate.bestbuy.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/06/csr-2014-final.pdf. 
 114.  Barnard, supra note 5, at 218 (“Creating a sustainability committee provides 
(some) evidence that a company is committed to performance that goes beyond mere 
compliance with existing and projected environmental laws. It can and does add flesh to 
those (ubiquitous) corporate mission statements that identify sustainability as one of a 
company’s key objectives.”). 
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Although significant debate can exist regarding the role of a corporation in 
the environmental movement, it remains clear that without changes in the 
regulatory landscape, current trends indicate that we will likely see an 
influx of different corporate sustainability initiatives in the near future.115  
Exactly how these will look, whether they are incorporated in executive 
compensation plans, appear solely on corporate websites, command a 
presence on board-level sustainability committees, or otherwise, remains 






























 115.  Id. at 225 (noting that the mini-trend of board-level sustainability committees 
“may be a leading indicator (a ‘green shoot’) of things to come.”). 
